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PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In view of the failure of defendants and intervenor 
to understand the posture of this case and the failure of 
defendants and intervenor accurately to state the facts, 





IN THE POSTURE OF THIS CASE BEFORE 
JUDGE ELTON, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. 
Plaintiffs had assumed that defendants, intervenor 
and the lower court understood the posture of this case. 
But the tenor of intervenor's brief,1 leads plaintiffs to 
conclude that intervenor and defendants missed the point 
of what was at issue before the lower court. 
The matter came before the lower court on plain-
tiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. This was the 
only matter at issue at the hearing before the lower 
court. No trial was had on the substantive issues raised 
in plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs have never been given 
an opportunity to take depositions, make other discovery 
or undertake other preparations for trial.2 All the lower 
court heard was plaintiffs' motion for an injunction 
pendente lite. 
The hearing judge ruled against plaintiffs, but in-
stead of merely denying plaintiffs' motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction and permitting plaintiffs to proceed to 
trial, the lower court dismissed plaintiffs' entire com- , 
plaint. Dismissing the complaint at this point of the 
proceedings was clearly wrong. 3 
1Defendants' brief copies intervenor's brief with only a few 
changes in wording. . _ 
2Plaintiffs were under the stress of a temporary restrammg or~er 
which allows only 10 days to prepare for the hearing on the motion 
for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs had t~ proceed a~ once. and do 
the best they could to obtain and prese_n~ evidence dunng this short 
period; otherwise the temporary restrammg order would have been 
dissolved. Ii 
auniess it is clear that plaintiffs 8re entitled to pr~vail, an a~p · 
cation for a preliminary injunction does no! inv?lve a fmal de~~Jlll· 
tion on the merits. The purpose of an in1unct10n pendente lite 1~~ 
prevent a threatened wr~ng, or the doii:ig o! any act pending the. fi he 
determination of the act10n and to mamtam the status quo until t 
issues can be determined after a full hearing. 
3 
There is a second reason why dismissal of the com-
plaint was not proper. At the time of the hearing neither 
intervenor nor defendants had made any motion to dis-
miss. A dismissal of the complaint when no motion to 
dismiss had been made is clearly erroneous because it 
deprives plaintiffs of "a fair opportunity to prepare to 
meet" the issue of dismissal. 1 Plaintiffs could not defend 
against a dismissal of its entire case when it was un-
aware that such action was being considered. 2 
1Remington Rand Inc. u. O'Neil, 4 Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416 
(1956) and 6 Utah 2d 182, 309 P.2d 369 (1957). Had plaintiffs been 
aware that the hearing judge was contemplating a dismissal of the 
complaint so that plaintiffs would not later have an opportunity at 
the trial to present all its evidence on the issue of spot zoning, plain-
tiffs would have put on its expert witnesses and others t.o show how 
insignificant would be the gain to the public, how extensive would be 
the damage to this solid residential area and to the flow of traffic 
through this intersection and how the proposed change of zoning has 
no substantial relation t.o any legitimate object sought to be gained 
through the exercise by Salt Lake County of its police power. 
2Rule 41(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "For failure 
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal .... " No Utah 
case decided under Rule 4l(b) has allowed a court to enter a dis-
missal sua sponte. Rule 4l(b) is based on§ 104-29-1(3) and (5) Utah 
Code 1943 (see compiler's note to Rule 41 (b)) which provided "an 
action may be dismissed ... (3) by the court when the plaintiff fails 
to appear and the defendant appears and asks for the dismissal . . . 
[or] (5) by the court upon motion of the defendant when upon the 
trial plaintiff fails .... " [Emphasis added] A long line of cases 
decided under § 104-29-1 make it clear that the grounds for a motion 
for dismissal must be stated, in order that the attention of the court 
and counsel may be called thereto and so that plaintiff may remedy 
any defects in his case which admit of correction. Graham u. Ogden 
Union Ry. & Depot Co., 79 Utah 1, 6 P.2d 465 (1931); Smalley u. 
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 34 Utah 423, 98 Pac. 311 (1908). Because 
the dismissal by the court sua sponte deprived plaintiffs of the op-
portunity to correct any defects in their case, it is clearly improper 
under the above cases. 
4 
The initial thrust of plaintiffs' appeal is, therefore, 
to obtain a reversal of the dismissal of the complaint 
and to have the complaint reinstated. 
Each of the points urged by plaintiffs below to per-
suade the judge to grant the motion for preliminary in-
junction and each of the points argued in plaintiffs' brief 
is also relevant to show that plaintiffs' complaint is suf-
ficiently meritorious to enable plaintiffs to stay in court 
and proceed to trial. Even if the issue of dismissal had 
been properly raised below, this Court unequivocably has 
held that citizen-owners of property affected by a pur-
ported change of zoning are entitled to have redress to 
the courts and may proceed to trial. This is the holding 
of this Court in its recent decision in the first Naylor1 
appeal, and is controlling on this point. 
On the issue of error in dismissing plaintiffs' com-
plaint, the evidence adduced at the hearing before the 
lower court on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunc-
tion, the evidence attempted to be introduced, and the 
pleadings, together with every logical inference which 
may be fairly drawn therefrom, must be viewed in that 
light most favorable to plaintiff s.2 This is not a case 
where plaintiffs have been to trial and, despite what 
intervenor and defendants assert on brief, neither inter-
venor nor defendants has an edge if there be conflicting 
evidence supporting the findings of the lower court. 
1Naylar v. Salt Lake City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d '!I 
(1965). 
zMartin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (1952); Clark v. 
City of Boulder, 146 Colo. 526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961). 
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II. 
THE POSTURE ON APPEAL OF THE LOWER 
COURT'S ERROR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MO-
TION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PEND-
ING THE TRIAL PERMITS ALL POINTS TO BE 
URGED. 
A second thrust of plaintiffs' appeal is that the 
lower court erred in not granting plaintiffs' motion for 
a preliminary injunction pending the trial. Plaintiffs 
are entitled to prevail on this motion if any of the fol-
lowing is as alleged : 
(a) Defendants' acts are illegal because they 
failed to follow statutory and other procedures re-
quired by law to give affected property owners a 
fair opportunity to be heard; or 
(b) Defendants' acts are unconstitutional be-
cause they have deprived dwelling owners of their 
constitutional protections; or 
( c) The purported zoning change is illegal and 
invalid for any other clear reason, such as: 
(1) Defendants arbitrarily and capriciously 
refused to perm.it dwelling owners to be heard 
in response to their written petition presented 
January 10, 1967; or 
(2) The purported change of zoning by de-
fendants is void because it otherwise arbitrarily 
and capriciously infringes upon the rights of 
dwelling owners; or 
(3) The purported change of zoning by de-
fendants is void because it is unjustly discrimi-
natory in that it constitutes indiscriminate spot 
zoning; or 
6 
( 4) The purported change of zoning by de-
fendants is void because it unreasonably devi-
ates from the newly adopted Master Plan and 
the existing comprehensive zoning map. 
On the motion for a preliminary injunction, plain-
tiffs urged that the evidence adduced at the hearing 
showed each of these reasons clearly. And plaintiffs 
have so argued on brief and still so urge. 
Intervenor's and defendants' assertion that the issue 
of invalidity of the zoning change because of arbitrary 
and capricious action by defendants was not raised be-
fore the lower court is not true; the point was pleaded, 
and argued before the hearing judge. 
Plaintiffs believe that of all issues pleaded, their 
showing was clearer on the points of lack of notice and 
the deprivation of constitutional protections. But if this 
Court does not hold with plaintiffs on these arguments, 
plaintiffs urge that nevertheless a sufficient showing 
has been made on other points for this Court to reverse 
the decision below and grant plaintiffs' motion for a 
preliminary injunction. On appeal plaintiffs are not 
foreclosed from urging any one or all issues because 
they gave greater emphasis below to one issue over the 
other issues pleaded. 
The change of zoning is invalid if it clearly appears 
to be beyond the power of the Commission; or is uncon-
stitutional as it deprives one of property without due 
process of law, or capriciously and abritrarily infringes 
upon his rights therein, or is unjnstly discriminatory.1 
1Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 
636 (1961). 
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The subject change of zoning appears on its face 
to be indiscriminate spot zoning1 and an unreasonable 
deviation from the Master Plan2 and the comprehensive 
zoning map and clearly in excess of the police power.3 
That there must be some reason to support a change of 
zoning is the clear holding of this Court in the second 
1This Court has condemned indiscriminate spot zoning. Marshall 
v. Salt Lffke County, 105 Utah 111, ~41 P.2d 704, 709 (1943). 
2Until 1965 Salt Lake County did not have a Master Plan. Prior 
to the Master Plan the land-use development of Salt Lake County 
was a hodgepodge, almost as chaotic as though no zoning ordinance 
had been adopted at all. What the Master Plan does is to adopt 
general concepts of how planning of land uses in Salt Lake County will 
proceed during the next generation (Ex. D-42, p. 1). Defendants 
adopted the Master Plan and put at rest matters which otherwise 
might be debatable, including the following: 
(i) Scattered, mixed development throughout Salt Lake Val-
ley is not to be permitted; instead commercial development is to 
be clustered around a major metropolitan center with related 
subcenters for local shopping such as the Cottonwood Mall (Ex. 
D-42, pp. 20, 21); 
(ii) Community and neighborhood shopping centers are to 
be from three to ten acres, with their design and location appro-
priate to this function (Ex. D-42, p. 31) (no new commercial 
area of smaller size is permitted by the plan); 
(iii) "Strip" zoning and "spot" zoning is not to be per-
mitted and residential areas are to be preserved free from intru-
sions of commercial development; 
(iv) Points of conflict are to be avoided between commercial 
development and a comprehensive network of expressways and 
major arterials for movement of rapid vehicular traffic (Ex. 
D-42, p. 28). 
This is not a case - as it would have been had it arisen before 1965 
- where the matter of a change of the zoning map was undertaken 
without direction of the Master Plan. In the instant case, one of 
the first to arise under the Master Plan, defendants ignore the ~lan 
and violate its fundamental concepts. The Master Plan has meaning. 
Concepts embraced by defendants when they adopted the Master 
Plan have substance to them. Citizens are expected to tum to the 
Master Plan for answers to questions about the County's future (Ex. 
D-42, p. 55). The Master Plan cann?t be alterec:J. unless there is some 
legally sufficient reason which benefits the public generally. No such 
reason exists here. 
3The Board of Salt Lake Count)'. ~mmis~ione~ does not have 
power to make any zoning change which it desires without regard to 
,· 
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Naylor appeal. 1 Otherwise there is no "foundational rea-
son" for the zoning. 2 The principal reason usually re-
whether the change has a substantial relation to a legitimate objective 
to be ac~mplishec;l 1?Y its police power. Its power to make zoning 
~h8:11ges IS not unlimit~d. \V_hen ~ change of zoning will have an in· 
Jlln?US. effect on. a solid residential area, _it can be done at all only 
if Wl~hin the_pohce power of the County, i.e., the gain to the general 
public outweighs the damage to the value of dwellings in the area. 
Authorities cited by intervenor and defendants on this issue are 
not in poi~t. Parki~on v: Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291, P.~d 400 (1955) 
(p. 28 of mtervenor s bnef and p. 27 of defendants bnef) is not a 
zoning case, nor does it involve a county commission; it involved a 
reapportiorunent statute. 
Shaffner v. City of Salem, 201 Ore. 45, 268 P.2d 599 (1954) was 
not a "spot zoning" case, and was so recognized as not a "spot zoning" 
case by the Oregon Supreme Court. That case involved a change of 
zoning for a service station in an area which was already essentially 
commercial in nature. Eighty feet south of the proposed station was 
a substantial business building occupied by an insurance firm. A build· 
ing occupied by an ice cream store was 256 feet to the south. Near 
the subject area was another service station, a grocery store and a 
meat market. The Oregon Court was clear that the change of zoning 
in that case would have been condemned had it been a "commercial 
island" in a residential area. Page v. Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 
280 (1946) so holds. 
The quotation from McQuillin on Municipal Corporations used 
by intervenor and defendants and which according to them was the 
basis for the holding in Shaffner is only part of the full text. What 
intervenor and defendants did not include in brief was the other 
quotation from McQuillin approved by the Oregon Court: 
The constitutionality and validity of zoning depend essentially 
upon a reasonable balancing of public interest in zo~ng as against 
opposing private interests in property. * * * That IS to say, the 
theory is to foster improvements by confining certain classes of 
buildings and uses to certain localities without imposing undue 
hardship on property owners. * * * 
On the one hand the detriment to public welfare that would 
result if zoning restrictions were removed must be weighed against 
benefit that would accrue to individual property owners. On !he 
other hand in determining the reasonableness of the assertion 
of public i~terest thr~mgh ~oning against. private personal and 
property rights, cons1deratio.n .ID:ust be given_ to the .e":tent to 
which property values are d1rmmshed by zorung restrictions, to 
the character of the neighborhood, and to the use being made 
of nearby property, and if 1J:ie gain to the public is small when 
compared with the hardship rmposed upon property owners t~en 
no valid basis for exercise of the police power through zomng 
exits [sic]. * * * 




quired to support a change of zoning is that the change 
will benefit the public. No such reason has or can be 
advanced by defendants or by intervenor in this case.1 
1There is . no basis fo~ concluding that any of the supporting 
reasons found m Naylor exist here. There is no showing of a gradual 
expansion of business and commercial usage of property outward from 
downt:own Holladay ?r fr?m .the. Cottonw_ood _Mall or from any other 
establish~ commercial district In the direction of this area. There 
is no showmg of congestion or deterioration of residences the removal 
of which may tend to alleviate health hazards or decre~se the crime 
rate, particularly among juveniles in that locality. There is no show-
ing that the proposed use would constitute a buffer zone between 
residential and commercial and business areas. 
Conf~~g a private e<;:<>nomic benefi~ on interv~nor is obviously 
not~ _sufficient reason. An u:icrease of vehicular traffic is not a legally 
sufficient reason because thIS would destroy the stability of zoning. 
Deligtish v. Greenberg, 135 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1954); Page v. Portland, 
178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946). Plaintiffs assert that no showing 
could be made that the subject parcel of land could not be used for 
any of the purposes authorized in a residential district. But such 
a showing, even if made, would not be a legally sufficient reason. 
Freeman v. Y o;nkers, 205 Misc. 947, 129 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1954). (Rezon-
ing of a corner lot located in the midst of a residential district to com-
mercial to permit the owners to establish a gas station thereon held 
invalid, no other commercial use having been allowed in the area 
and there being no reasonable ground for believing there would be 
a need within the reasonable future for a gas station on the subject 
corner in view of the presence of other stations in the area.) 
The subject parcel is far too small to develop as a separate com-
mercial area. It amounts to a little island of commercial use created 
in an essentially different district. The Master Plan and comprehen-
sive zoning ordinance would be worthless if the owner of each indi-
vidual, small parcel of land could have the zoning changed to suit 
his own inclinations. Parker v. Rash, 314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687 
(1951). Even if a showing were made of substantial growth of popu-
lation, such condition is common to almost any populated area of the 
United States and even if population growth might call for a change 
in the Maste; Plan to be made from time to time, such a showing 
could not justify a special regulation having no uniform application 
which singles out this small parcel for private benefit to its owner. 
Parker v. Rash, supra. A showing ~hat the proposed use of appli~~mt's 
property would substantially contnbute to the general welfare IS not 
a legally sufficient reason because in a sense eve!)'. lawfully c~nducted 
enterprise contributes to the general welfare. Ibid: A showmg that 
the subject property would have greater econo~~ value as com-
mercial property does not constitute a legally sufficient reason. Pen-
nin~ v. Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 65 N.W.2d 831 _(1954); Paqe v. P'!rt~nd, 
supra. An increase in traffic count on abutting str~ets is no_t m !~elf 
sufficient justification for a zoning change to permit a gasolme filling 
station. Ruskin v. North Lake, 55 Ill. App.2d 184, 204 N.E.2d 200 
(1964). To the same effect is the indistinguishable case of Clark v. 
City of Boulder 146 Colo. 526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961). 
Even if it had been established that there has been teenage love 
making on the site, s~ch an occurrence at most. would be a mere 
nuisance which would nnpose on the landowner (mtervenor) a duty 
to abate. Intervenor cannot breach i~ du~y. to aha~ a nuisance and 
thereby establish a reason for a gasolme fillmg station. 
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Plaintiffs urge that this change of zoning is so flag-
rantly wrong that defendants cannot show a legally suf-
ficient reason to support it and this ground alone is 
sufficient reason to grant the motion for preliminary 
injunction.1 This is the thrust of the material included 
under Point V of plaintiffs' brief entitled "Defendant 
Commissioners' Actions Were Arbitrary and Capri-
cious." 
Having clarified the posture of the issues before 
this Court on appeal, plaintiffs will correct the erroneous 
statements of fact made on brief as well as respond to 
new matters raised on brief by intervenor and defend-
ants relating to the issues of the lack of a fair oppor-
tunity to be heard and deprivation of constitutional pro-
tections. The purposes of this part of plaintiffs' reply 
will be to demonstrate the error in denying plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction and the error in dis-
missing the complaint. 
III. 
THE FACTS ARE NOT AS STATED BY INTER-
VENOR AND DEFENDANTS WITH RESPECT TO 
THE INVALIDITY OF THE ACTION OF DEFEND-
ANTS BECAUSE OF HAVING PRECLUDED AF-
FECTED PROPERTY OWNERS FROM HA YING A 
FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON DECEM-
BER 28, 1966. 
In asserting the sufficiency of the so-called notice 
given of the so-called hearing before the Salt Lake 
icwrk v. City of Boulder, 146 Colo. 526, 362 ,P.2d 160 (1!!61) is 
a case which is factually and procedurally a car.hon copy. of the rnstant 
case on all issues other than the lack of notice. quest10n. f'.ropertY 
improperly rezoned was the su~ject of a 1!1-0~10n f?r. pre~mmary 
injunction. The lower court demed the prelumnary m1unct10n and 
dismissed plaintiff's complaint. On appeal the Colorado Supreme 
Court not only reversed but granted relief to plaintiffs. 
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County Commission on December 28, 1966, both inter-
venor and defendants have neither fully nor accurately 
stated the facts; further, they have relied on assertions 
of fact not proved. Plaintiffs will complete and clarify 
the facts relevant to this issue. 
Intervenor makes the flat assertion that "two Mor-
mon Bishops" attended the hearing before the Planning 
Commission (on this particular change of zoning) and 
as "representatives" of the people in the area advised 
them of the application for a change of zoning. Inter-
venor relies heavily on this in argument. Defendants 
make substantially the same assertions. There is nothing 
in the record to support such statements; each is untrue. 
One "Mormon" Bishop (Baird) and a former "Mor-
mon" Bishop (Wallin) were witnesses at the hearing 
before Judge Elton. Wallin was not present at any 
Planning Commission meeting which considered the ap-
plication of intervenor; he knew nothing about any pro-
posed change of zoning until he learned the last of 
December (1966) or the first of January (1967) that the 
former County Commission had changed the zoning (R. 
131). Any implication by intervenor that Wallin was 
present at an administrative hearing and informed the 
members of his ward about anything is not only untrue 
but unfair. 1 
'Bishop Birrell of the Hollad~y El~venth ~ard (the transcript 
says Bishop Morrell, R 9~) _was with. BIS~op ~rurd at ~h~ N~vem~r 
18, 1966, Planning Com.rmss1on m~eti,1;1g gettmg perm~ss10n _on a 
little Holladay Eleventh Ward Project (R. 96). ~here IS no ev1de~ce 
at all that Bishop Birrell acted Ill'! a representative ~f any d~elli_ng 
owner in connection with the subject property or discussed it with 
anyone. Geographically, the boundaries of the Holladay Eleventh 
Ward are not close to the subject property. 
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The other witness, Baird, is Bishop of Holladay 
Third Ward in which geographic area the subject prop-
erty is situate. Rather than being of help to intervenor 
and defendants, evidence supplied by Baird is far more 
helpful to plaintiffs, because it shows how defendants 
first created a deceptive situation, which caused the 
dwelling owners to let down their guard, and then how 
they permitted this deceptive situation to continue un-
corrected. We review the evidence. 
During late summer of 1966 plaintiff Audrie Ken-
nington and Baird heard rumors about a change of zon-
ing on the subject property and did what alert citizens 
should have done - they inquired personally of the 
Planning Director, defendant McClure, about how dwell-
ing owners could protect their rights. Baird and Mrs. 
Kennington made a personal visit to McClure in his 
office in August, 1966 (R. 93). Baird also phoned Mc-
Clure a few times asking about it (R. 96). Here is the 
start of the deceptive situation created by defendants. 
McClure indicated to Baird and to Mrs. Kennington "that 
we probably would hear more about this as time went 
on" (R. 95). Baird was told by McClure that to process 
a change of zoning application he (McClure) needed the 
names of property owners near the subject property (R. 
95). The only possible significance of such a statement 
by McClure, in the context of the inquiry by Baird, was 
that adjoining property owners would be informed about 
any hearing which affected their rights. McClure per· 
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mitted the inquiring dwelling owners to believe that the 
need for the names of property owners was for notifying 
them that something was happening in their area (R. 
95). Even though dwelling owners made these inquiries, 
no one on behalf of defendants told any dwelling owner 
that the matter would be considered by the Planning 
Commission on November 18, 1966. Baird, an architect 
by profession, happened to have a matter for the Holla-
day Eleventh Ward which was to be considered before 
the Planning Commission on November 18, 1966. It was 
at this time that he heard the Planning Commission deny 
intervenor's application. Even though defendants knew 
Baird and Mrs. Kennington were interested in the change 
of zoning on the subject property, no one on behalf of 
defendants told Baird on November 18, 1966, or there-
after, that the application of intervenor denied by the 
Planning Commission might be appealed to the Salt Lake 
County Commission (R. 96). Nor was he informed that 
a further hearing might be held by the County Com-
mission at which he or other dwelling owners might 
appear in opposition and that the County Commission 
might reverse. Instead Baird was led to believe that the 
granting of the application was unlikely. Both inter-
venor and defendant concede on brief that Baird thought 
approval of the application was unlikely. He would not 
have thought so unless led so to believe by defendants. 
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Had it been done deliberately,1 nothing could have 
been better calculated to get Baird to "drop his guard" 
and to mislead him into thinking that the action of the 
Planning Commission was final and that he need not 
be concerned about any further proceedings. Thereafter 
defendants did nothing to set Baird straight. When 
intervenor appealed to the County Commission, defend-
ants knew about it but neither Baird nor Mrs. Kenning-
ton knew about it. McClure knew the constructive nature 
of the notice procedures which he had been directed 
to follow (which would not really warn dwelling owners 
in the area) and he knew or should have known that 
Baird and Mrs. Kennington might not learn about the 
date and time of the hearing scheduled for December 
28, 1966, because he had theretofore received complaints 
from other property owners about the ineffectiveness 
of the "notice" procedures used by the County (R. 160). 
1 Plaintiffs do not necessarily contend that defendants created the 
deceptive situation intentionally. Plaintiffs have no reason to sup· 
pose that a professional planner (not an elected politician), such as 
McClure, would have any objective other than to do what was for 
the best for the citizens of Salt Lake County. McClure could not 
expect on November 18, 1966, that the lame-duck out-going Cowity 
Com.mission would conduct a "present-for-everyone party" three days 
after Christmas and pass a "Christmas-tree" ordinance granting every 
application that had been arranged to be before it on that day. Nor 
could McClure expect on November 18, 1966, that this County Com· 
mission would be so calloused as to ignore completely the unanimous 
recommendation against the change of zoning by its own zoning 
staff (of which McClure was a member) and by the Planning Com· 
mission and thereby violate the fundamental concepts of the Master 
Plan (which the County Commissio~ had so _recently adoJ:?ted) ~y 
creating this small spot of commerCJ.al zone m an otherwISe solid 
area of "real valuable" residences. 
But whether done inadvertently or otherwise, defendants did 
create the deceptive situation and permitted it to exist uncorrected 
until after the December 28, 1966, "hearing" had been completed. 
It was then "too late." 
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But neither McClure nor anyone else on behalf of de-
fendants told Baird that a further proceeding was being 
und0rtaken, or that another hearing would be held before 
the County Commissioners who might reverse. Defend-
ants permitted this deceptive situation to continue.1 De-
fendants had a duty to speak and inform Baird of this 
danger. Defendants also had a duty to warn Mrs. Ken-
nington. Defendants failed to do either. The unfairness 
of defendants' conduct is emphasized by McClure's send-
ing to applicant a letter advising it of the time of the 
Salt Lake County Commission meeting to be held De-
cember 28, 1966. But why no letter from McClure to 
Baird or to Mrs. Kennington 1 Defendants knew these 
dwelling owners were interested and wanted to appear 
m opposition. 
A similar deceptive situation was created when 
McClure told plaintiff Audrie Kennington to watch for 
red-lettered signs to be tacked to utility poles near the 
property. Because of her inquiry, defendants knew that 
::>he was interested in any proposed change of zoning on 
this property. But no one on behalf of defendants in-
formed Mrs. Kennington that there ·would be a hearing 
on the application of intervenor before the County Com-
lThere is no evidence that anyone on behalf of defendants 
informed Dr. Clark Hall or any other member of the Holladay Dis-
trict Planning Commission of a further hearing before the County 
Commission. Defendants could not reasonably expect Dr. Hall or 
any other member of the Holladay District Planning ~m.rn!ssi?n 
to inform or warn the residents in the Holladay Planrung Distnct 
that there would be a further hearing on December. 28, 1966, _wh~n 
defendants had not even told any member of their own D1stnct 
Planning Commission about the further proceeding._ In this ,bac;k-
ground defendants will not be heard to blame their ow~ DIStnct 
Planrui;.g Commission for not warning residents of the distnct. 
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mission on December 28, 1966, which would affect her 
rights. What more can a citizen do than make a personal 
inquiry of the County official responsible for change of 
zoning matters, follow his directions and search diligently 
on utility poles for paper notices that were no longe~ 
theret 1 
At the so-called hearing on December 28, 1966, the 
lame-duck County Commissioners may not have known 
that there were dwelling owners within the area of the 
subject property who wanted to object, but defendant 
McClure knew, and thereby his principals knew. When 
applicant had completed its presentation before the 
County Commission on December 28, 1966, and no one 
appeared in opposition, it was McClure's duty to speak 
and to inform the Commissioners in substance that he 
knew of opposition to the change of zoning and specifi-
cally that he had talked to Mrs. Kennington and Baird, 
each of whom had expressed to him their desire to ap-
pear in opposition. These known dwelling owners were 
thereby deprived of a fair opportunity for a hearing. 
Defendants may not be heard to assert as they have 
on brief, that this case should be controlled by archaic 
rules permitting constructive notice where interested 
tAudrie Kennington was watching the very pole near the inter· 
section of 4500 South and 2300 East (where the paper sign was sup· 
posed to have remained) to see when the notice was placed there 
(R 20) It did not stay there long enough for her to see it. To 
make ~atters worse even though McClure told Mrs. Kennington 
that she would see ~ paper sign on utility poles near the property 
specifying the time and place of the "hearing," neither McClure nor 
anyone on behalf of defendants ever ascertained whether the paper 
signs remained on the poles long enough for her to see them, . or 
whether she in fact saw them and thereby knew when the heanng 
was to be. 
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:persons are unknown. Defendants knew who these two 
dwelling owners were and that they were interested -
and defendants knew that many dwelling owners resid-
ing within the geographic boundaries of Holladay Third 
Ward, of which Baird was Bishop, also were interested. 
This is a case of wholly inadequate constructive 
notice procedures - a type of notice which in plain fact 
is a fiction, 1 and incompatible with the ease of modern 
conununication. But this case is much more. This is a 
case where defendants created a deceptive situation with 
respect to individual homeowners who defendants knew 
were trying to protect their rights. The unbending re-
fusal of defendants, who perpetuated the wrong in the 
first place, to permit these persons to be heard is so 
patently unfair and wrong that this Conrt should reverse 
the lower court on general principles of fair play2 and 
without ever reaching the issue whether constitlltional 
due process was violated. 3 
1Defendants and intervenor cite in support of their position the 
1876 case of Graham v. Fitz, 53 Miss. 307. Times have changed since 
1876; methods of communication have become much more direct, and 
citizens today are entitled to be informed by their elected public 
officials, whose compensation they pay with their taxes. In addition, 
Graham v. Fitz, supra, is out of point because it was a case of a 
trustee's sale where it could not possibly be known who the prospec-
tive buyers might be. 
ZThis Court has already decided this issue in favor of plaintiffs, 
when persons to be affected are krwwn. In Naisbitt v. Herrick, 76 
Utah 575, 290 Pac. 950 (1930) (page. 28 C?f plain~iffs' brief) this Co~ 
reversed a default judgment in a qmet_ title a~on where ~e movmg 
party relied solely on constructive notice to mform a claimant who 
was in possession. 
3This Court in Naisbitt v. Herrick, supra, indicated in dictum 
that the constructive notice in that case did not measure. up to tl~e 
state and federal requirements that one may not be depnved of his 
property without due process of law. 
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Defendants and intervenor try to argue that the 
whole notice procedure of the County could be thwarted 
if surrounding property owners could toll the thirty 
day "notice" period by tearing down the paper signs 
from utility poles. The attempted argmnent does not 
make sense. The law of this Court is clear that had 
defendants written a letter, telephoned or otherwise in-
formed the property owners within 150 feet of the sub. 
ject property of the hearing and had such property own-
ers appeared at the hearing and been heard, they could 
not raise the question of lack of notice.1 The easy way 
to avoid any tolling would be for defendants to inform 
property owners within 150 feet of the subject property,2 
as well as to inform property owners who come to their 
office and make personal inquiry. This would prevent 
such property owners (who had actual notice) from rais-
ing an issue of notice and would make moot whether or 
not the paper signs stayed on the utility poles. Naylor v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., supra. 
For defendants and intervenor to suggest inappro-
priate activity by persons who did not even know that 
there was going to be a hearing is preposterous. As of 
that moment when the pieces of paper were tacked on 
the utility poles (November 26, 1966) who knew that 
the pieces of paper were there~ ~rhere are only two 
1Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 172 Utah 2d 306, 410 P.2d 764, 
766 (1966). . 
2The existing procedure of defendants is that names and addressi;s 
of these persons are to be supplied to defendants by ~pplicant:. 'l_'hJS 
information is an integral part of every change of zorung appli_catio'.1· 
No one has explained why this procedure was not f~llowed 1!1. ~his 
case. The mailing of such notice need not be defendants respo_ns1b1mailht~. 
Defendants could make an applicant for a change of zorung 
notices to contiguous property owners. 
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groups of persons - defendants and intervenor. There 
is no evidence that any other person in the area or else-
where then knew that the pieces of paper had been or 
would be tacked to the utility poles. 
Plaintiffs were not able to prove who or what tore 
the paper signs off the utility poles. Plaintiffs proved 
that the paper signs did not stay on the poles long 
enough for anyone living in the area to see them.1 
The evidence supplied by plaintiffs that neither of 
the paper signs stayed on the poles long enough to be 
seen is not negative evidence (as intervenor and defend-
ants imply). Plaintiffs produced positive evidence. Wit-
ness Wallin looked at the west face of the north pole 
many times between Thanksgiving and Christmas and 
saw thereon only the four corners (fragment remnants) 
and the tacks, and "that is all" (R. 127). Witness Plum-
lee looked at the west face of the nol'th pole many times 
during the same period and saw that nothing was on 
1Even though a friend of Bill Roderick's son (R. 63) - who can 
hardly be characterized as "uninterested" - testified he saw a paper 
sign, he also testified the sign might have been on a pole at an inter-
section other than 2300 East and 4500 South (R. 64). This witness 
merely drove by in an automobile; he did not get out of the auto-
mobile, nor walk to any utility pole nor read any sign. On the day 
he said he saw the signs he was driving his own car and was pro-
ceeding south on 2300 East (R. 55). At the intersection he thought 
he turned left (eastward) onto 4500 South (R. 60), so that the pole 
was on his right (R. 61). He had no idea what day it was that he 
saw the sign (R. 60). He did not kno:n where he was in ~h~ inter-
section when he looked (R. 61). He did not remember noticmg any 
zoning signs until asked by Bill Roderick's son to be a wi~ess 
(R. 63). Defendants' own witness Hardeman, who tacked the pie?IB 
of paper to the utility poles, testified that he placed the paper sign 
so high on the north utility pole that it could not be seen by a pass-
ing motorist (R. 177). A paper sign on the west face of the north 
utility pole could not be easily seen by the driver of a south bo~d 
car turning east onto 4500 South; the pole would be on the opposite 
side of the car from the driver and the paper on the west face of 
the pole would have been behind the witness as he proceeded east. 
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the pole (R. 140). Witness Henrichsen, who was entirely 
objective, testifying that he was "neither for it [the 
change of zoning] nor against it," (R. 91) observed 
"nothing" on either pole (R. 87) even though both poles 
were next to his walkway from which he removed snow 
(R. 87).1 Witnesses Keller and Kennington similarly 
supplied positive evidence that the paper signs were not 
on the poles during this period. 
Plaintiffs make a brief reply to the assertion by 
both intervenor and defendants concerning other change-
of-zoning applications which they allege would be af-
fected by a decision in this case. There is nothing in 
the record upon which defendants or intervenor can 
base their assertion of the existence of 1200 other appli-
cations which could be affected by a decision in this 
case. Plaintiffs do not believe that there exist 1200 other 
applications having facts similar to this application. But 
if that is not so, and if the situation is as defendants 
and intervenor imply, i.e., that there are 1200 other situ-
ations where property owners have not been notified of 
the "hearing," have been misled by County officials, and 
have learned of the zoning change subsequent to the 
"hearing" but have requested and been denied relief be-
fore the ordinance was placed into effect, then this Court 
should put a stop to such unfair action by defendants 
in destroying property values of hundreds of thousands 
1Thls witness, above all the others, because he resides right next 
to the subject property, would have seen one or the other of t?e paper 
signs had they remained on the poles for very long after having been 
affixed. 
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of residents of Salt Lake County without an adequate 
opportunity to be heard. 1 
Plaintiffs reply to the position taken by defendants 
and intervenor that plaintiffs and other property owners 
in the area adjoining and near the subject property are 
not entitled to the protection of the constitutional due 
process rules as developed by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Defendants and intervenors seem to be saying that 
plaintiffs are not entitled to have the benefit of the rules 
laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Mul-
lane, Schroeder and Walker,2 because the instant case is 
not a condemnation case. Plaintiffs submit that the pro-
cedural due process rules apply to any governmental 
proceeding where citizens are entitled to be heard. A 
fair chance to learn about a proceeding affecting human 
rights is fundamental to our constitutional society. It 
doesn't have to be a condemnation case. This Court has 
1Two wrongs do not make a right. Two hundred forty thousand 
wronged property owners in Salt Lake County do not make the con-
duct of defendants right. For decades, accused in criminal cases have 
been deprived of their constitutional rights of counsel and of being 
free from third degree methods to obtain confessions. The existence 
of such procedures over the years is no justification for continued 
abuses. During recent terms of the United States Supreme Court, such 
time-honored procedures have been consistently condemned under 
the due process protection of the Qonstitution of. th~ United. States. 
In like manner the existence of widespread depnvation of nghts of 
property owners in Salt Lake County, even if proved, ~ no justifica-
tion for perpetuation of the status quo. It woul4 not be likely to deter 
the United States Supreme Court from correcting such wrongs. Nor 
should it deter this Court. 
2Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950); Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); and Walker v. 
City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956). 
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held in Gayland1 that the constitutional protections 
against deprivation of property without due process or 
by unjust discrimination are available to affected prop-
erty owners in change-of-zoning cases. 2 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction should 
have been granted for one or all of the following reasons: 
a. Defendants' acts are Hlegal because defend-
ants have deprived dwelling owners of a fair oppor-
tunity to be heard; 
b. Defendants' acts are unconstitutional because 
defendants have deprived dwelling owners of their 
constitutional protections; and 
c. The purported change of zoning is illegal 
and invalid in any event. 
But if for some reason this Court does not hold 
that the motion for preliminary injunction should have 
been granted, the complaint nevertheless should be re-
lGayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 636 
(1961). 
2This Court also has determined that property rights might be 
seriously affected by the enactment of a zoning ordinance and for 
this reason the requirement for notice and a hearing may not be 
treated lightly. Because of the potential detrimental effect of a zoning 
change upon property rights the action of the legislative body becomes 
quasi judicial in character and due process may not be dispensed with. 
Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954) 
quoting with approval from Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 
134, 277 Pac. 308 (1929). 
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instated and plaintiffs should be given an opportunity 
to try the issues raised by the complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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